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Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States from
1913 "to 1921, became deeply involved in the Mexican Revolu
tion from the day of his inauguration.

His policies directly

influenced the course of Mexico's history during that era and
for a generation thereafter.

Mexico, the preeminent inter

national concern of the Wilson administration until June,
1915* provided the President with an opportunity to export
his brand of Progressivism.^

Wilson's self-righteous

missionary zeal and his attempt to impose an ill-conceived
2
policy collided with a fervent revolutionary nationalism.
The outcome was predictable.

Despite the advice of his closest advisor, Colonel
Edward M. House, his old schoolmate "honest and honorable
Cleveland Dodge," experts in international law in the
Department of State, and American investors with Mexican
interests, Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize the provi
sional government of Victoriano Huerta.

From the time of

his inauguration in March of 1913 and throughout the remain
ing spring, pressures for recognition steadily increased.
Huerta's assassination of Madero and overthrow of Mexico's
constitutional government deeply offended Wilson's moral
sensibilities and according to the then Secretary of the
Navy Josephus Daniels, the President clung tenaciously to
the belief that "it would be wrong from every consideration
to recognize the usurper."-^

This signified an important

departure from the long-standing policy of the United States
to matter-of-factly extend recognition to whomever exercised
power in Mexico City.
In the Cabinet meeting of May 23, 1913, the Presi
dent and his aides made the final decision not to recognize
A
Huerta.
Wilson subsequently sent former governor of
Minnesota, John Lind, to Mexico City with instructions to
inform Huerta that recognition of any future government

2

True, the Revolutionists declare that they will take
part in no election so long as Huerta remains . • • hut
. . . even that may he arranged. We could set negotia
tions going and prohahly hring ahout an armistice and a
real election.7
Unfortunately, Wilson seriously overestimated the mallea
bility of the Constitutionalists and underestimated Huerta's
intransigence.
Wilson, through his agent John Lind threatened,
consoled, and even tried "harefaced bribery" in an attempt
to persuade Huerta to step down and agree not to stand for
Q

reelection.

Huerta proved to he a tough and able adversary.

For a time it seemed that Wilson’s hopes for a peaceful
resolution to the stalemate might he realized.

Huerta's

Secretary of Foreign Affairs notified Wilson through Lind
that the Mexican Constitution prevented Huerta from
succeeding himself and Huerta announced in September "his
ardent desire to turn the government over to a constitutional
„9
successor.
In October 1913» however, Huerta dashed all hopes for
a peaceful settlement when he arrested and imprisoned his
political opponents in the Mexican Congress.

Wilson now

found himself in accord with the militant Constitutional
position.

He had tried in every way possible to remove

Huerta from power.

As the diplomatist Howard F. Cline noted,

"Wilson's difficulties are an eloquent rebuttal to those who
think it is a simple matter to dislodge even a small-time
Strong Man under optimum circumstances.

Short of armed

5
10

invasion, a last resort, nothing worked.”

But Wilson

learned that there were definite limits to moral suasion.
Convinced that nothing could "be accomplished by dealing with
"a desperate brute like that traitor H u e r t a , W i l s o n
decided to assist the rebel movement in forcefully ousting
Huerta.
On November 1, Wilson dispatched an ultimatum
threatening direct military intervention if Huerta failed to
*1 p

resign immediately.

Huerta brazenly refused.

Wilson's

imprudent bluff proved counterproductive, lessening American
credibility and temporarily rallying Mexican support for
Huerta, "who now became (to his own surprise) a symbol of
political independence in the face of Wilsonian pressures.”1^
Wilson's ominous threats— then vacillation— almost aborted
the rebellion.

By December of 1913> Huerta's position

seemed impregnable.
Wilson must have pondered this curious turn of
events.

Huerta, who a few months before had been despised

almost everywhere outside Mexico City, was now a hero.
Wilson once again failed to grasp the nationalistic impulses
that accompanied revolution.

Anti-foreignism was perhaps

the dominant theme of the revolution shared almost without
exception by radicals, moderates and reactionaries, only
Pancho Villa stands as a prominent exception.
Wilson moved on several fronts in the fall of 1913
and early winter of 191^.

There is substantial evidence to

suggest that he seriously considered forming a military
alliance with Carranza.

Colonel House noted in his diary of

October 3°*
The President has in mind to declare war against
Mexico. . . . He will first blockade the ports, thereby
cutting off all revenue from the Mexican Government
Which will have a tendency to break down Huerta's
resistance.
He has in mind also throwing a line across the
southern part of Mexico, and perhaps another line just
south of the Northern States. He plans to send troops
to the Northern States, if they, the Constitutionalists
consent, in order to protect the lives and property of
foreign citizens* ■ • •
It is his purpose to send six battleships at
once. . . . The President seems albert and unafraid. 15
These plans were never revealed to Carranza, the "First
Chief."

Perhaps Wilson never seriously considered imple

menting them; but they do indicate the changing attitude of
a frustrated President.

Late in October, William Bayard

Hale was sent to Arizona to confer with Carranza, who was at
that time in Hermosillo forming a provisional Mexican govern
ment.

He met with Carranza and his subordinates during the

second week in November.

Hale conveyed Wilson's plan to

mold an interim government once Huerta was deposed.

In

addition, Hale tried to impress upon Carranza the necessity
for safeguarding the lives and property of foreign nationals
in Mexico in order to stifle the growing interventionist
sentiment in the United States.

In return, the United States

would lift the arms embargo, thus allowing the revolution-I

aries to acquire badly needed arms.

£

7
Carranza denounced such putative interference in
Mexico's internal affairs; the First Chief correctly
perceived that if Wilson's conditions were met, it would he
the President of the United States who would determine the
course of the revolutionary movement in Mexico.

The central

point of contention between Wilson and Carranza was the
insistence by the latter that the United States government
not interfere.
concurred.

In most other matters of substance, they

For example, the Constitutionalists, through

Hale, assured the President of early elections.

Hale

reported s
Their answer to your question as to their intention
to give the people an early opportunity to elect
President and Congress at free and fair elections is an
earnest affirmative and they further affirm that they
will surrender the Government into the hands of those
selected . . . even though persons selected were not
preferred by them.17
Despite these assurances, Wilson ordered Hale home.

He

could not frighten Huerta out of office and the Constitution
alists would not defer to his judgment; so Woodrow Wilson
adopted a policy of "watchful waiting."
By January of 191^1 Wilson had gained a much clearer
picture of the Constitutionalists and their cause.

Luis

Cabrera, Carranza's special agent in Washington, had opened
an enlightening dialogue with the State Department.

His

objective, of course, was to persuade Washington to lift the
arms embargo; simultaneously, he reassured Wilson via the
1ft
State Department of Carranza's aims.
Cabrera's dialogue

included extensive discussions into the nature of the reforms
19
proposed hy Carranza and the Constitutionalists. 7 Probably
for the first time, Wilson grasped some of the social and
economic ramifications of the revolution.

Within a few

months, Wilson would publicly endorse what would have seemed
unthinkable six months before— nothing less than social and
economic revolution.
Wilson's heightened sensitivity toward the revolu
tion and the virtual military stalemate that had developed
in Mexico influenced his decision to lift the arms embargo
on, February 3, 191^.

John Lind and other American agents

advised Wilson that to gain the offensive, the Conbtitutionalists badly needed arms.

20

Yet, the lifting of the arms

embargo had little immediate effect on the military fortunes
of the Constitutionalists.

In late March, Lind advised that
21
the United States directly intervene.
Fortunately, Wilson
realized that Lind's proposal to send the Marines into
Mexico City might once again rekindle support for Huerta and
certainly alienate the Constitutionalists over whom thb
President hoped to exert some influence.
On April 9> Huertista soldiers mistakenly arrested
and detained some U.S. Naval personnel in Tampico.

Although

the sailors were quickly released with an apology by the
Mexican commander, the incident provided a pretext for
Wilson to order the occupation of the strategic port of
Veracruz.

Wilson, at first reluctant to take such an

adventurous step, probably was influenced by John Lind,
recently returned from Mexico.

Lind assured the President

that the citizens of Veracruz would welcome liberation from
the oppressive Huerta and no resistance to the occupation
should be anticipated.

22

The President apparently concluded

that such limited intervention would not seriously antagp.®
nize Carranza since the major source of Huerta's revenues
would be denied the First Chief.

Too, Wilson probably anti

cipated (and in the future took advantage of) the political
leverage afforded by the occupation.
The taking of Veracruz did not go as smoothly as
anticipated and when the smoke cleared, there were nineteen
Americans dead; the Mexican casualties exceeded three hun
dred.

When the news reached Wilson, he was "appallbd and

unnerved.

Huerta and Carranza in bellicose indignation

demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Americans.

A

perplexed and downhearted President attempted to reassure
the Constitutionalists that the United States had no inten
tion of conducting a war against the Mexican people, but was
2h
merely seeking reparations from Huerta.
The full impact
of a failed policy now demanded reassessment.
The first indications that Veracruz had a telling
effect on Wilson and his Mexican policy surfaced almost
immediately when he accepted an offer of multilateral
arbitration.

The occupation of Veracruz caused considerable

concern in Latin America.

It appeared as if the United

10
States was once again engaging in "gunboat diplomacy."
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the A. B. C. powers) offered
to mediate the dispute.

Wilson had no desire to resolve any

thing with the Huerta regime, but accepted mediation in hopes
of eliminating Huerta and avoiding further bloodshed.

He

so informed the mediators and added that the government
displacing Huerta must prosecute "such reforms as will
reasonably assure the ultimate removal of the present causes
of discontent. J

Later m

the negotiations, Secretary of

State Bryan forcefully reiterated Wilson's positions
It would in our judgment be futile to set up a
provisional authority which would be neutral. It must,
to be successful, be actually, avowedly, and sincerely
in favor of the necessary agrarian and political
reforms, and it must be pledged to their immediate
formulation, not merely requested to devote special
attention" to them.26
Predictably, Carranza refused to be bound by the
negotiations.

He could not tolerate outside intervention—

even if it worked in his favor.

Meanwhile, Wilson did

everything in his power to see that the Latin American
mediation effort concluded with Carranza and the Constitu
tionalists in power,

Wilson refused to accept any other

solution.2 '7 Despite the fact that the mediators demanded
and received acceptance of a strict arms embargo to all
combatants in Mexico, Wilson, the great moralist, made sure
that ammunition reached the rebels when they desperately
28
needed it.
While the mediators debated, the Constitution
alist armies pressed forward.

11
Although the essence of revolutionary nationalism
eluded Wilson, by April he demonstrated an awareness of the
underlying causes of the revolution.

According to Wilsons

It is a curious thing that every demand for the
establishment of order in Mexico takes into consider
ation, not order for the benefit of the people of
Mexico, the great mass of the population, but order for
the benefit of the old-time regime, for the aristocrats,
for the vested interests, for the men who are respon
sible for this very condition of disorder. No one asks
for the order because order will help the masses of the
people to get a portion of their rights and their land;
but all demand it so that the great owners of property,
the overlords, the hidalgos, the men who have exploited
that rich country for their own selfish purposes, shall
be able to continue their process undisturbed by the
protests of the people from whom their wealth and power
have been obtained.29
The President went on to say, "My passion is for the
submerged 85 percent of the people.

..."

He attributed

much of Mexico's problem to "the virtual enslavement of
Mexico's peasantry."

Although he did not say so, he was in

effect embracing the concept of class war.
turning back the clock.

There was no

As he put it, "I say to you that

the old order is dead."-^
Yet he persisted in his view that only the United
States could "properly direct" the Mexicans "so that the new
order which will have its foundation on human liberty and
human rights, shall prevail."-^1

In the spring of 191^,

Wilson was at least abreast of Carranza in the revolutionary
scheme of things•
Prior to the Veracruz intervention, Wilson's Mexican
policy had been based on the naive assumption that Mexico's

problems could be solved by a new constitution and free
elections.

With a few "good men," Wilson felt that reform—

New Freedom style— would, if implemented, redress the social
and economic ills that plagued that nation.

Fortunately,

Wilson came to understand that the Mexican was not merely
a Spanish speaking Anglo-Saxon and that fundamental differ
ences did exist.

Wilson's idealism resulted in an incoherent

and unrealistic policy during his first year in office.

Yet,

with all its inconsistencies, this idealism allowed Wilson
to ride the revolutionary tide and avoid the strong undertow
of interventionist sentiment in the latter half of 1914 and
1915-

As the summer of 1914 approached, Wilson confronted a

new and unsettling problem— the disintegration of the
Constitutionalist coalition which he now so avidly supported.
There was never any real doubt in Wilson's mind
about who should lead the new revolutionary government.

Of

the three major revolutionary leaders, Villa, Zapata, and
Carranza, only the latter met Wilson's standards.

Villa and

Zapata were excellent leaders and had more loyal followers
than Carranza.

Yet, neither was well-educated or refined.

Their provincialism and radicalism could lead to unpredict
able results.
On the other hand, Venustiano Carranza and Wilson
shared a certain political symmetry— essentially bourgeoisEach viewed change as desirable and proper when accomplished
in an orderly (constitutional) and democratic way.

Carranza
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lacked Wilson's intellectual depth.

He was according to

one historian, "bourgeois mediocrity incarnate."

The First

Chief was, however, a dedicated liberal in the vein of Gomez,
Farias, Juarez, Lerdo and Madero.

His primary objective was

political reform; social and economic reform was necessary
he felt, but not along the radical lines proposed by Villa
and Zapata.

32

In recent years an apparent consensus has evolved
among historians which asserts that Wilson's Mexican policy
drifted aimlessly through the revolution. 33

This view,

however, is applicable only to the first year and a half of
his administration.

By the summer of 1914, Wilson had

embarked on a new and ambitious program to assure the
ascension of Venustiano Carranza.

Wilson's desire to

"assist" Carranza directly conflicted with the nationalistic
underpinnings of the revolutionary movement.

While the

resulting enmity between the two ebbed and flowed, Wilson
continued to mold his policies to Carranza's advantage.
When Venustiano Carranza entered Mexico City on
August 18, 1914, he faced the impossible task of maintaining
the broad coalition that had swept Huerta from power.
Already a de facto split had occurred between the revolu
tion’s two most powerful leaders, Villa and Carranza/which
had been temporarily repaired with American assistance.

The

State Department was busy throughout the summer trying to
abort an open breach.

Villa— who openly distrusted the First

14

Chief— and Emiliano Zapata threatened new violence unless
an acceptable compromise could he found.

34

Unfortunately, divisions in the ranks of the revolu
tionaries went far beyond personalities.
problem was Carranza's Plan de Guadalupe.

Central to the
Its intent was

political and basically consistent with the Constitution of
1857*

For some months, Carranza had promised to move beyond

mere political issues, and embrace social and economic
reform.

Now the time had come to define the specific nature

of that reform and delineate measures to accomplish it.
Carranza, the former hacendado, clung to an essentially
moderate approach.

Zapata and Villa rejected Carranza's

position and resented his imposition of a virtual military
dictatorship.

By the early fall, it was evident that no
3^
compromise could avert renewed fighting. J
Wilson, closely following events in Mexico during

the summer of 1914, hoped that with Huerta out of the way,
the revolutionaries might somehow iron out their differences
amicably.

Carranza's announced intention to establish a

"revolutionary military rule" disturbed Wilson because it
controverted assurances made to him by Carranza's representa
tives that his primary objective was to reestablish constitu
tional rule.

Nevertheless, Wilson intimated that this did

not necessarily preclude the possibility of recognition if
Carranza acted moderately.36

The United States supported the

Convention of Aguascalientes in which the followers of

15
Zapata, Villa and Carranza attempted to reach some form of
agreement.

The attempt failed and threw the forces of the

Constitutionalists (Carrancistas) and the Conventionists
(Villistas and Zapatistas) once again into the field— this
time on opposite sides.

Officially, the United States

adopted a position of neutrality. 37
Legitimate grounds existed for the United States
to extend de facto recognition to the Conventionist governop
ment in Mexico City.
In addition to occupying the
capital, they controlled most of the countryside.

Ostensi

bly, they were more representative of the revolution, having
been elected by a majority of delegates assembled at Aguascalientes; the Conventionist President, Eulalio Gutierrez,
was a former Carrancista.
Then too, there were more pragmatic advantages for
the Wilson Administration to assist the Conventionist
government.

In the United States, Villa, the most powerful

Conventionist leader, engendered a great deal of popular
suppprt.

Portrayed in the press as a kind of latter-day

Robin Hood, his romantic image combined with his amiable
attitude toward America and Americans making him a popular
if not heroic figure.
been well-received.

Carranza, on the other hand, had not
The American Catholic Church vehemently

despised him because of his anti-clerical stand.

More

importantly, Villa had shown himself much more receptive-to
suggestions from the White House than the obstinate

16
Carranza. ^

Wilson must have been tempted to support some

one over whom he could exert substantial influence.
Yet Wilson insisted on an official neutrality, a
posture which could benefit only Carranza.

While the major

source of Villa's income (Chihuahua's beef) was forbidden
entry into the United States for "sanitary reasons," Wilson
c

turned over the revenue generating port of Veracruz to
kn
Carranza.
At the same time, the United States government
made no attempt to cut off the shipment of arms to the
Constitutionalists albeit publicly urging compromise and
decrying the destruction of life and property.

Whether or

not the United States intentionally bent its neutrality, its
position decisively enhanced Carranza's ability to wage war
while simultaneously diminishing that of his enemies.
For over six months, Mexico convulsed in unrelenting
warfare.

Wilson devoted his major efforts toward safe

guarding the lives and property of Americans and other
nationals caught in the midst of the fighting (he feared
inflammatory acts might ignite public opinion in the United
States to a degree he could not control).

Thus, he expended

enormous diplomatic energy securing assurances from both
sides that they would respect foreign lives and property.
Considering the extent of carnage and lack of central
authority, Wilson's endeavors in this regard were remarkably
successful.

Until the chaos subsided somewhat, the United

States could do little else.
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Throughout the winter and early spring of 1915.
the Constitutionalist armies slowly advanced northward, hut
neither Villa nor Carranza's key general, Obregon, could
sustain a concerted military effort.

Reports of anarchy

and chaos continued to inundate the State Department.
In an obvious bid for recognition, Carranza issued
a proclamation designed, in part, to reassure the President
of his commitment to constitutional government.

Once law

and order were reestablished, the First Chief promised he
would establish a democratic government, protect religious
freedom and institute agrarian reform.

In addition, he

agreed to settle the question of foreign debt and scrupu
lously observe the property rights of foreign nationals.^
Carranza's proclamation pleased Wilson.

"This is

a very sensible document," he wrote Bryan, "though West's
report . . . does not seem to afford much prospect of real
control by Carranza."

Duval West had been sent to Mexico

by Wilson to assess the military and political situation
there.

From Wilson's point of view, the news was not good.

West seriously misjudged the military posture of the Consti
tutionalist armies and reported that the possibility of
decisive victory by either side was remote. J

The President

obviously had hoped that Carranza's prospects would be
brighter.

"It is disappointing of course," he remarked,

"but what we wanted was the truth.

Wilson, deluded by

West's report and believing Carranza's movement on the verge
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of collapse, still refrained from seriously negotiating
with the apparent victors•

On April 19 > through his

Secretary of State, the President refused to receive a
formal Conventionist delegation.
In addition to assuaging the American President,
Carranza attempted to prod Wilson into recognition hy
exploiting racial tensions along the border.

The full extent

of the First Chief's involvement with the Plan of San Diego
is still not entirely clear; undoubtedly, however, it was
substantial.

While his representatives disavowed any

association with the escalation of border raidssecretly encouraged them.

Carranza

This chimerical endeavor to

pressure Washington ultimately failed, but in the early
summer of 1915i border strife reinforced the administra
tion's perception that instability in Mexico continued
unabated. ^
The Constitutionalist forces failed to achieve any
major victories between the time West filed his report and
h6
the President decided that some new initiative was needed.
On June 2, Wilson issued a stern statement to the press in
which he warned the factional leaders that they must somehow
'’accommodate their differences and unite" or the United
States would be compelled to take some decisive action.
Furthermore, Wilson threatened to end official neutrality
and "support some man or group of men" if the revolutionaries
could not solve their problems-^

Wilson must have realized

by now that the obstinate First Chief was unlikely to
respond positively to this form of intimidation.

Perhaps

the President hoped to pressure Carranza's adversaries into
a negotiated submission.

This view seems tenable in light

of Wilson's instructions to his Secretary of State on the
same day.

Wilson advised Bryan not to rule out the possi

bility of recognizing Carranza "if he should develop the
l^Q
necessary influence to bring order out of chaos."
The first week of June yielded indications of the
emerging military ascendancy of the Constitutionalists.^
Following his defeat at Leon de las Aldemas, Villa accepted
Wilson's call for a negotiated settlement.

The Convention

ist leader, claiming he controlled the largest share of
Mexico agreed to meet with Carranza and the other chiefs in
order to avoid American intervention.

Carranza, tasting

victory, refused to reply (directly) to the Wilson initia
tive.

Instead, he issued a manifesto calling on foreign

powers to recognize his regime.

The First Chief once

again was rejecting Wilson's assistance, or as Carranza
perceived it— interference.
Partly because of West's report, and partly because
of his experience with the ever changing situation in Mexico,
the President continued to be cautious.

While Villa

exaggerated the extent of Conventionist control, vast areas
of Mexico remained outside the hegemony of the Constitution
alists.

Nonetheless, The New York Times correctly reported

20
the administration1s apparent willingness to recognize
Carranza if the Constitutionalists occupied the capital and
<1
demonstrated some ability to contain Villa.
On June 17, the President ashed his new Secretary of
State, Robert Lansing to convey to Carranza the possibility
"that we might recognize him" if the First Chief would make
52
some gesture of conciliation toward the other factions.
Carranza refused the President's offer.

Wilson, extremely

disappointed at Carranza's continued intransigence, worried
that there was little prospect of anything but continued
53
fighting. ^
With this thought in mind, Wilson approved a
proposal by the Secretary of State to join with the A. B. C.
ii
it54powers and attempted to bring order out of chaos.
Lansing suggested the United States present a plan to invite
representatives of the various factions in Mexico to the
conference table for the purpose of establishing a coalition
government.

Lansing maintained that the retirement of

Carranza, Villa and Zapata was necessary if peace was to be
55
achieved.
Wilson approved the general thrust of the plan,
but rejected as unrealistic the idea that each of the major
leaders retire.^

The President intended to keep the door

open for Carranza.
When the conference began, Lansing evidently failed
to understand the President's predisposition toward

57
C a r r a n z a . I n the first meeting, Lansing argued the

21
senselessness of attempting to deal with Carranza as "he had
no intention of surrendering his will to constitutional
government."'^

When he learned of Lansing's statement, the

President admonished Lansing stating "Carranza will somehow
have to he digested into the scheme and ahove all the object
■I 59
of the revolution will have to be in any event conserved.
In another note, the President endorsed Carranza's
decision to establish a temporary dictatorship.

He wrote

Lansing:
It seems to me necessary that a provisional
government essentially revolutionary in character
should take action to institute reforms by decree
before the full forms of the constitution are
resumed. This was the original program of the
revolution and seems to me probably an essential
part of it.60
The United States extended de facto recognition to
the Constitutionalists in October.

Thereafter, Wilson

confronted a Mexican Chief of State unwilling to be directed
by Washington.

"It's a great pity," the President observed

about Carranza, "that nothing can be done either with him or
through him."

Nonetheless, the President must have taken

some comfort in the fact that the leader of the revolution
adhered to a liberal, bourgeois social and political philos
ophy.
By his own standards, Wilson's policy was a success.
He achieved his immediate goals.
Carranza in power.

Huerta was gone and

Villa and Zapata now posed no real

threat and a new constitution was being drafted.

22
Yet the legacy of Wilson's handling of the Mexican
situation is not positive.

It reinforced in Mexico and

throughout Latin Americai’the image of American imperialism
and interference.

Wilson's vacillation, confusion and

ignorance prolonged Huerta's regime and led to increased
losses of life and property.

Finally, Wilson's singleminded

support of Carranza and his brand of Constitutionalism may
well have thwarted the revolution's true destiny and
potential.
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The works concerned with Wilson's political
philosophy are too numerous to mention. Probably the best
is still Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson: The New 'Freedom,
(Princeton, 1956). The application of that theory to
diplomacy, is covered in Link's Wilson t h e 'Diplomat1st,
(Baltimore, 1957)* Carranza's political philosophy remains
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tution to the delegates assembled, at Gueretaro give the best
indication. For a brief analysis, see Ward M. Morton," The
Mexican Constitutional Congress of 1916-1917,” Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly, 33 (June, 1952).
-^See for example Arthur Link, Wilson? The- Struggle
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R,G.59. N.A.
^Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 261-263*
■^Hill, Emissaries, p. 339*
-^~The New York Times, June 5» 1915■^^jansing instructed Silliman to present the
President's position to Carranza. Robert Lansing to John R.
Silliman, June 18, 1915, 812.00/l526la. For Wilson's
instructions to Lansing, see Woodrow Wilson to Robert
Lansing, June, 1915, 812.00/15285, R.G-59, N.A.
33
^Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, July 2, 1915,
812.00/154091, R *G •59, N.A.

<4

Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, June 22, 1915,
812.00/153381, R.G.59, N.A.
^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1915,
812.00/15412|, R.G.59, N.A.
•^Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, July 8 , 1915,
812.00/15412!, R.G-59, N.A.
57
This is not surprising, Wilson often bypassed the
State Department. Link, Wilson the Diplbmat1st, p. 23.

27
Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, August 10, 1915»
812.00/1586k&, R.G.59, N.A.
59
-^Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, August 11, 1915,
8l2.00/l5753i, B.G-59, N.A.
^0
Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, August 8, 1915,
812.00/I5752i, R.G.59, N.A.
-

Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, August 31, 1915,
8l2.00/l6017i, R.G.59, N-A.

Bibliography
I.

Primary Sources

Public Documents and Archival Sources
U. S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin.
XLIX (August 5, 1963), 199-203.
_____ . Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1912. Washingtons
Government Printing
Office, 1919.
________ . Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1913. Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1920.
________ . Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1914. Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1922.
________ . Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1915. Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1924.
________ . Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1916. Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1925.
________ . Papers -Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Lansing; Papers, 1914-1920. 2 vols.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940.
________ . Papers of the Department of State Relating to the
Internal Affairs of Mexico: 1910-1929. Record Group 59,
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
________ . Register of the Department of State. 1917.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918.
________ . Register of the Department of State, 1922.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
28

29

Edited Documents
Fabela, Isidro (ed.)« Documentos historicos de la Revolucion
Mexicana. Revoluci^n y regimen Constitucionalista.
& o l « DT”Mexico, D. F.: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica,
1960o
Fabela, Isidro (ed.). Documentos histc^ricos de la Revolucion
Mexicana. Carranza, Wilson y el ABC. Gfol. IIII.
Mexico, D. F.s Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1962.
Newspapers
El Paso Morning Times
The New York Times
The Saturday Evening Post
IIo

Secondary Works

Blum, John Morton. Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of
Morality. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co.,
1956c
Braddy, Haldeen. Cock of the Walk: The Legend of Pancho
Villa. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1955.
Brenner, Anita, and George R. Leighton. The Wind That Swept
Mexico. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943.
Callahan, James Morton. American Foreign Policy in Mexican
Relations. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1932.
Gallcott, Wilfrid Hardy. The Caribbean Policy of the United
States, 1980-1920. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1942.
Calvert, Peter. The Mexican Revolution. 1910-1914: The
Diplomacy of~Anglo-American Conflicti ("Cambridge Latin
American Studies," N o . 3) Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968.
Clendenen, Clarence C. Blood on the Border: The United States
and the Mexican Irregulars. Toronto and London:
The
MacMillan Co., Collier-MacMillan, Ltd., 1969.

30

________ . The United States and Pancho Villa. Ithaca, N. Y.s
Published for the American Historical Association,
Cornell University Press, 1961Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Cambridge,

Cockroft, James D. Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican
Revolution. 1910-1913. ("Institute of Latin American
Studies, The University cf Texass Latin American
Monographs," No. 14) Austin: University of Texas Press,
1968.
Coletta, Paolo E. William Jennings Bryan. Vol. I: Political
Evangelist, 1860-1908. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1964.
________ . Williams Jenning Bryan. Vol. II:
Progressive
Politician and Moral Statesman, 1909-1915. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1969»
Cumberland, Charles Curtis. The Mexican Revolution:
Genesis Under Madero. Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1952.
Daniels, Josephus. The Wilson Era: Years of Peace 1910-1917,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944.
" Grieb, Kenneth J. The United States and Huerta.
University of Nebraska Press, 1969.
Gruening, Ernest. Mexico and Its Heritage.
London: The Century Co., 1928.

Lincoln:

New York and

Guzman, Martin Luis. The Eagle and the Serpent. Translated
by Harriet de Onis. Garden City, N. Y . : Doubleday and
Co., Inc., 1965.
Haley, Edward P., Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy
of Taft and Wilson with Mexico. 1910-1917. Cambridge,
Mass. Harvard University Press, 1970.
Hill, Larry D. Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's
Executive Agents in Mexico, Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1973.
"Houston, David F. Eight Years With Wilson’s Cabinet. 2 vols.
Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1926.
Leuchtenburg, W. E.,
"Progressivism and Imperialism:
The
Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy,
1898-1916," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 39,
(Spring, 1952), 483-504.

31

Lieuwen, Edwin. Mexican Militarism. 1910-1940;
The Rise
and Fall of the Revolutionary Army. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1968.
Link, Arthur S.
Princeton:

Wilson; Confusions and Crises. 1912-1915.
Princeton University Press, 1964.

________ . Wilson:
The New Freedomi
University Press, 1956.

Princeton:

Princeton

________ . Wilson:
The Struggle for Neutrality.
Princeton University Press, 1960.
________ . Wilson the Diplomatist.
Hopkins Press, 1957.

Baltimore:

________ . Woodrow Wilson and Progressive Era.
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1954.

Princeton:

The Johns
New York:

Meyer, Michael C. Huerta: A Political Portrait.
University of Nebraska. Press, 1972.

Lincoln:

________ . Mexican Rebel:
Pascual Crozco and the Mexican
Revolution, 1910-1915. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1967.
Notter, Harley. The Origins of the Foreign Policy of
Woodrow Wilson. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press,
1937.
Nye, Russell B. Midwestern Progressive Politics. East
Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State Unrersity Press, 1959.
0 'Shaughnessy, Edith. A Diplomat;'s Wife In Mexico.
Harper and Bros., Pub., 1916.

New York:

Quirk, Robert E. An Affair of Honor. Louisville:
University of Kentucky Press, 1962.
________ . The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915.
Indiana University Press, I960.
Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Madero.
University Press, 1955.

Bloomington:

New York:

Columbia

Sherman, William L., and Richard E. Greenleaf. Victoriano
Huerta: A Re-appraisal. Mexico, D. F.: Mexico City
College Press, 1960.
Simpson, Lesley Byrd. Many Mexicos. 3rd ed., rev. Berkely:
University of California Press, 1964.

32

Stephenson, George M. John Lind of Minnesota.
University of Minnesota Press, 1935«

Minneapolis!

Stuart, Graham H. American Diplomatic and Consular Practices
New York!
D. Appleton-Century Co., 1952.
Vera Estanol, Jorge. La Revolucion Mexicanas Origenes y
resultadoso Mexico, D. F.i Editorial Porrua, S. A.,
1957.
Contemporary Articles
Bemis, Samuel Flagg.
"Woodrow Wilson and Latin America,"
Edward H. Buehrig (ed), Woodrow Wilson's Foreign
Policy in Perspective. Bloomington!
Indiana University
Press, 1957.
Blaisdell, Lowell L. "Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow
of Madero," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly. XVIII
(September, 1962), 125-35.
Brandt, Nancy.
"Pancho Villa:
The Making of a M o d e m
Legend," The Americas. XXI (October, 1964), 146-62.
Challener, Richard.
"William Jennings Bryan," in Norman A.
Graebner (ed), An Uncertain Tradition: American
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century. New York
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961.
Hinckley, Ted C. "Wilson, Huerta and the Twenty-One Gun
Salute," The Historian, XXII (February, 1960), 197-202.
Harris, Charles H. and Sadler, Louis.
"The Plan of San Diego
and the: Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A
Re-examination," The Hispanic American Historical, Vol.
58, No. 3, (August 1978), 387-398.
Machado, Manuel A. Jr., "The Mexican Revolution and the
Destruction of the Mexican Cattle Industry,"
Southwestern Historical Quarterly. LXXIX, No. 1 (July,
1975) .
Norton, Ward M.,
"The Mexican Constitutional Congress of
1916-1917," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
33 (June, 1952) 318-27.

